Avoiding information about adverse welfare consequences of self-interested decisions, or strategic ignorance, is an important source of corruption, anti-social behavior and even atrocities. We model an agent who cares about self-image and has the opportunity to learn the social benefits of a personally costly action. The trade-off between self-image concerns and material payoffs can lead the agent to use ignorance as an excuse, even if it is deliberately chosen. Two experiments, modeled after Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007) , show that a) many people will reveal relevant information about others' payoffs after making an ethical decision, but not before, and b) some people are willing to pay for ignorance. These results corroborate the idea that Bayesian self-signaling drives people to avoid inconvenient facts in moral decisions.
"Living is easy with eyes closed."
The Beatles, "Strawberry Fields Forever" (1967) .
Introduction
Willful avoidance of evidence about the negative social impact of one's own decisions, or 'strategic ignorance', plays an important role in political and corporate corruption, the perpetuation of conflicts and even genocide. Participants in the Watergate scandal are said to have shown "intense faith in the immunizing power of deliberate ignorance" (Simon, 2005, p.5) . Top Enron executives argued at trial that their ignorance of any fraud should exonerate them, despite the fact that they had explicitly instructed Enron's lawyers to abstain from inquiries into Enron's accounting practices (Simon, 2005) . In the Holocaust, many bystanders and perpetrators sought to remain ignorant of the atrocities committed in their communities or under their command so as to avoid accountability to their own conscience (Bankier, 1996; Horwitz, 1991) .
Complementing the field evidence about the importance and prevalence of strategic ignorance is recent evidence from the laboratory. In experimental allocation problems where participants can choose whether or not to reveal how their choice will affect others, many choose not to know (Dana, Weber, and Kuang, 2007; Larson and Capra, 2009; Feiler, 2007; Matthey and Regner, 2011; Ehrich and Irwin, 2005) . Paradoxically, these experiments also show that most people choose a fair outcome if they know that a selfish choice hurts the other participants. These findings can not be explained by standard models of distributional preferences, which predict that those who sacrifice to avoid the adverse consequences of their actions should also acquire costless information about these consequences.
A common explanation for the attractiveness of ignorance in moral dilemmas is that it serves as an excuse for selfish behavior. This explanation broadly relates to the idea that people care about their reputation, captured by economic signaling models. However, reputation concerns do not fit the results of the giving experiments from which the evidence is drawn, in which subjects were anonymous and no participant observed whether or not the decision maker actually chose to be ignorant. This has led several authors to suggest that ignorance is used to protect the decision maker's self-image (e.g., Dana, Weber, and Kuang, 2007; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) . Self-image has long been accepted by psychologists as an important source of motivation (e.g., Bem, 1972) and was first incorporated into an economic signaling model by Bodner and Prelec (2003) .
Although plausible, the self-image explanation raises the question how ignorance can succeed as an exonerating strategy if it is clear that the actor chose to be ignorant. Should not willfully chosen ignorance undermine its own strategic value? Indeed, the judge in the Enron case instructed jurors to be skeptical of ignorance-based excuses: "You may find that a defendant had knowledge of a fact if you find that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him..." Without understanding the value of deliberately chosen ignorance in signaling equilibrium, it is difficult to see how a self-image model can explain the paradoxical findings on strategic ignorance.
We use a standard preference-signaling model to establish formally that strategic ignorance is consistent with Bayesian self-signaling. The model, presented in Section 2, features a decision-maker who cares about her own material well-being and-to some degree-that of others, as well as her self-image as an altruistic person. The decision maker first chooses whether to inform herself about the social benefits of an action that is personally costly and then chooses whether to engage in that action. We prove the existence of an equilibrium in which ignorance is strictly preferred by a non-zero share of the population. Although consciously avoiding information leads to a diminished self-image, the stigma attached to knowingly engaging in harmful actions is worse, since this involves pooling only with completely selfish types. Thus, remaining ignorant serves to avoid a choice between two evils: to take a personally costly action, or to be revealed as an immoral individual.
The ignorance equilibrium can explain three broad behavioral patterns that have been observed in previous experiments and are otherwise difficult to explain. The first pattern is sorting: people who inquire about the consequences of their actions are more prosocial on average than those who are given information exogenously. Second, self-imposed ignorance induces a partial exculpation from egoistic motives. The third pattern is the evasion alluded to above: some subjects who act prosocially with full information about the consequences of their actions will not acquire such information voluntarily, even if it is free of charge. Thus, our research rationalizes a wide variety of findings related to strategic ignorance and clarifies how willfully chosen ignorance can succeed as a strategy.
To test further predictions of the model that are not compatible with models of outcomebased preferences or social image concern, we report the results of new experiments in Section 3. In these experiments, modeled after Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007, henceforth, DWK) , participants play a binary dictator game, in which the dictator is initially uninformed whether choosing the option with the higher personal payoff hurts or helps the recipient.
In Experiment 1 we vary the timing of the dictator's choice of whether to find out the consequences of her own actions. In one treatment, following DWK, the dictator can obtain the information about the recipient's payoffs before she makes the allocation choice. In another treatment, the dictator can reveal the information after having made a contingent allocation choice. Models of outcome-based motivations predict that fewer subjects will remain ignorant if they can reveal information before the allocation decision is made, since in this case the information can be used to make a more informed choice. In contrast, we observe that ignorance is more common when it can be chosen before than after the allocation choice. The self-signaling model explains this result, since it predicts that ignorance loses its strategic value to protect self-image after a moral choice is made.
In Experiment 2 we vary the costs of obtaining information. We show that people choose ignorance more frequently as the cost of information climbs, and that some people are willing to pay to remain ignorant. 1 The latter finding is inconsistent with models of outcomebased preferences, but not with the self-signaling model that predicts that in the ignorance equilibrium some types are strictly better off without information.
These experiments provide the first clear evidence that Bayesian self-signaling is an important driver of giving behavior. An alternate, social-signaling explanation for the results is not plausible, since subjects were anonymous and recipients could not observe the information acquisition choice of the dictator in either experiment. Moreover, recipients' information and instructions remained unchanged across the two treatments of Experiment 1. Although Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2009) and Fischbacher and Heusi (2008) find support for the idea that people are motivated to maintain a self-concept as honest and non-greedy, previous tests have not found evidence in favor of self-signaling models of giving behavior (Grossman, 2009) .
The model in Section 2 is adapted from that of Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and closely related to that of Grossman (2009) . Despite the emphasis on self -image concerns as a driver of prosocial behavior, it is technically similar to the social signaling models of Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) , Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), and Tadelis (2011) . Bénabou and Tirole (2011) use a similar signaling model to analyze strategic ignorance in the context of taboos, but do not explicitly model both the decision to remain ignorant and the decision to take an ethical action, and cannot compare the social image of behaving badly unknowingly with that of knowingly behaving badly, which is the focus of this paper. The reasoning used by Andreoni and Bernheim (2009, online appendix) to explain why some people are willing to pay to avoid a dictator game is similar to the reasoning we invoke: opting out helps to avoid a low social image resulting from the decision not to share. However, they model the image related to the 'outside option' as exogenous, whereas the central theoretical exercise in this paper is to endogenously derive the image associated with ignorance.
Our analysis of strategic ignorance in moral dilemmas contributes to a broader literature of non-signaling models examining strategic ignorance in various contexts. The common thread among these models is the analysis of ignorance as a way to avoid to making 'wrong' decisions in the future. Our model model shares this feature, in the sense that an agent's ignorance about the consequences of her actions serves to avoid large signaling investments in prosocial behavior that would be necessary to maintain a good reputation under full information.
For example, Nyborg (2011) finds that agents are willing to pay to avoid information about the value of contributions to public goods and Caplin and Leahy (2001) show how 1 Independent recent work by Cain and Dana (2012) finds similar results.
anticipatory utility can lead to strategic ignorance. Carillo and Mariotti (2000) show that ignorance about the health risks of certain activities like smoking, can be rational for a time-inconsistent agent. Similarly, Bénabou and Tirole (2011) argue that an agent may prefer not to get feedback on her abilities, because being overconfident about those abilities reduces under-investments resulting from present-bias. Aghion and Tirole (1997) show that managers may want to stay ignorant of the payoffs for different projects if doing so increases the de facto authority of subordinates, thereby raising their incentives to gather information. Domingues-Martinez, Sloof, and von Siemens (2010) provides experimental evidence for such strategic ignorance. Finally, Crémer (1995) argues that strategic ignorance of the personal circumstances of the agent can help a principal to credibly implement stronger incentives, because it reduces the moral hazard associated with conditional incentives.
This research also relates to a large literature on 'motivated cognition' in social psychology (e.g. Kunda, 1990 ) and a growing theoretical and empirical literature in economics showing that people downplay negative feedback about their competence and are sometimes willing to pay not to receive any feedback at all (Köszegi, 1996; Möbius, Niederle, Niehaus, and Rosenblat, 2011; Eil and Rao, 2011) . Although this literature has some intuitive parallels with this study, it does not address the moral trade-off that is at the heart of our analysis.
Finally, our self-signaling explanation fits with historical, philosophical and literary works on the subject. For example, philosopher and essayist Michel de Montaigne famously wrote that "Ignorance is the softest pillow on which a man can rest his head." One of Thomas Gray's best known poems ends with the line "where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise."
Novelist Saul Below alludes to the strategic nature of ignorance when he states "A great deal of intelligence can be invested in ignorance when the need for illusion is deep" (Bellow, 1976, 127) . Finally, singer Bob Dylan seems to ask the same question that motivates this paper: "How many times can a man turn his head, and pretend that he just doesn't see?" ("Blowin' in the wind", 1963).
History has shown that the consequences of strategic ignorance include moral failure in all levels of society (Cohen, 2001) . Perhaps nowhere does one find a starker example than in the Holocaust, in which the pursuit of ignorance was motivated to large extend by selfimage concerns. Bankier (1996) researched the information on genocide available to the public under the Nazi regime, and writes that "many deliberately sought refuge from the consciousness of genocide and tried to remain as ignorant as possible: because it salved their conscience. Knowledge generated guilt since it entailed responsibility, and many believed that they could preserve their dignity by avoiding the horrible truth " (1996: 156 (Von Below, 1980, 404) .
Signaling Equilibrium in a Model of Image Concerns
Why do people choose not to know the consequences of their own actions? To answer this question, we apply a model which combines preferences over material payoffs with a) an intrinsic concern for social welfare and b) a preference for a (self) image as a prosocial actor.
The model
We assume that there is a population agents of measure 1, each of whom chooses whether to take a prosocial action (a = 1) or not (a = 0). Taking the prosocial action comes at a utility loss of c to the agent, and has a potentially positive impact on aggregate welfare, denoted by W . The agent does not know the size of W , but she knows that W = w with prior probability p, and W = 0 with complementary probability. To make things interesting from a welfare perspective, we assume that w > c.
Before the agent decides, she has the opportunity to inform herself about the true welfare impact (I = 1) at a cost k, or to remain uninformed (I = 0). We call the latter decision or state 'strategic ignorance'. For simplicity, information takes the form of a perfectly informative signal σ ∈ {σ w , σ 0 , ∅}, where σ w denotes a 'high signal' (W = w), σ 0 denotes a 'low signal' (W = 0), and with some abuse of notation ∅ denotes the case in which no information is acquired.
Timing. Thus, the timing of the game is as follows: 1. Nature selects the level of W ∈ {0, w} associated with activity a.
2. The agent chooses whether to receive a signal about the level of W .
3. The agent chooses whether to take the prosocial action (a = 1) or not (a = 0).
4. The agent's actions a and the signal content σ are perceived by an observer and payoffs are realized.
Preferences. The agent has preferences that can be represented by the following vonNeumann-Morgenstern utility function
Here, the first term denotes the payoff of the activity, which consists of the welfare benefit of the activity multiplied by a parameter θ, the 'type' of the agent, minus the costs. The type θ is private information of the agent, and can be interpreted as the degree of altruism or prosocial motivation of the agent. The fact that low types care less about welfare ensures the single crossing-property that underlies the separating equilibrium in the next section. The second term of the utility function is the cost of information k. This cost could be negative, when information is presented in a way that makes it hard to avoid.
The last term denotes the payoffs from image concerns, where E[θ | σ, a; s] is the inference made by the observer about the type of the agent. This inference can be conditioned on the observed choice a, the content of the signal σ (and therefore the information acquisition decision), and the (equilibrium) strategy s of the agent. For simplicity, we assume that the agent cares directly about her image, but one could view this as a reduced form representation of a model where the agent derives material benefits from a positive inference by the observer, e.g., by engaging in surplus-generating future interactions. The parameter µ captures the importance of image concerns in the utility function of the agent.
We assume that there are two kinds of agents in the population:
1. There is a fraction ε of homo economicus, who only cares about her own material payoff, i.e. θ = µ = 0. The existence of such an agent is suggested by studies on prosocial behavior which typically find one-fifth to one-third of the population to be "selfish types" (e.g. Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) , Kurzban and Houser (2005) , and
Burlando and Guala (2004)).
2. There is a fraction 1 − ε of social agents who care about their image and about social welfare. With respect to the latter, we assume that there is a common prior that the type θ is distributed according to F (θ) with full support on [0, 1]. With respect to the former, we will assume that 0 < µ < c, i.e., image concerns are small relative to material concerns. This rules out that agents take the prosocial action purely for image reasons.
This distribution is consistent with evidence from dictator games, where we typically see a large spike of selfish choices as well as a dispersed distribution of more generous behavior (see Engel, 2011 , for an overview).
Self-image and social image. Preference-signaling models like the above admit two distinct interpretations of the identity of the observer. First, there is a social signaling interpretation in which the observer may be one or more other people. In this case, our assumption that the observer sees the information obtained by the agent is quite strong. Nevertheless, social-signaling is likely to play a role in decisions that can be expected to come under legal and therefore public scrutiny. In the Nuremberg, Enron, and Watergate trials, a central issue to the prosecution was who knew what when.
Second, there is a self-signaling interpretation of the agent as having dual selves, with a deliberative self trying to impress a Smithian "imagined spectator" or "man in the breast", or a Freudian "super-ego". 2 A variation of this interpretation is that the agent is observed by future selves, who lack introspective access to the agent's type. 3 In the self-image interpretation, the importance of image concerns does not rely on observability of actions by others and it is natural to assume that the observer knows the the content of the signal.
Strategic ignorance in equilibrium
We focus on a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which all types play a strategy s * that maximizes their utility given the behavior of the other types and beliefs are formed by the application of Bayes' rule wherever possible. We assume the tie-breaking rule that a fraction 0 < α < 1 of agents who are indifferent between acquiring information or not will acquire information. The proofs for the results in this section can be found in Appendix A. The main theoretical result of the paper is the following.
Proposition 1 There exist ap < 1 and k < 0 <k, such that if p >p and k ∈ (k,k), there exists a semi-separating equilibrium characterized by θ * ∈ (0, 1), in which a) the homo economicus chooses a = 0 and acquires information if and only if k ≤ 0, b) all social types θ < θ * remain ignorant and choose a = 0, while all social types θ ≥ θ * acquire information and choose a = 1 if and only if the signal is high.
To understand the equilibrium, consider the trade-off for a social agent of a relatively low type.
If she remains ignorant, she pools with the lower types θ < θ * and reduces her image relative to the prior expectation. She also suffers a utility cost of pθw, which can be interpreted as disutility stemming from social preferences. On the upside, she avoids paying the cost of prosocial behavior c.
If she acquires information, she faces a lottery. When the signal is low, she can pool with the high types without any material sacrifice. When the signal is high, she faces a choice between two evils. She can take the prosocial action and obtain a high image at a price of c. Or she can be selfish and end up with the lowest possible image. The latter result obtains because either (if k ≤ 0) she pools with the homo economicus or (if k > 0) beliefs for this off-equilibrium action are assumed to be 0. 4 When the probability of a high signal is sufficiently large, the low type strictly prefers to remain ignorant.
It is worth noting that the strategy of the marginal types just below θ * specifies that these types behave pro-socially in the subgame where they receive a high signal. Thus, ignorance protects (self) image, because an ignorant person can credibly make the counterfactual statement that "if I had found out, I would have behaved prosocially." The reason she does not find out is the anticipation that following a high signal, the strong image incentives to be prosocial would cause her to 'overinvest' (from an ex-ante perspective) in prosocial behavior.
In general, θ * need not be unique, but a sufficient condition for uniqueness and stability of equilibrium is that
where δ(θ * ) is the increase in (expected) image when choosing information rather than remaining ignorant. 5 Although our analysis concentrates on a 'strategic ignorance equilibrium', the model admits another pure-strategy 'no-ignorance equilibrium' with very low (offequilibrium) image for ignorant agents. In this equilibrium the image associated with acting selfishly under ignorance is lower than doing so under full information. Therefore ignorance is never chosen by the social agents if k is small. Which, if any, of these equilibria will be played is an empirical question. However, the existence of the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 provides a rational explanation for the findings of previous experiments, as well as the experiments reported in this paper.
4 With respect to refinements, because payoffs depend directly on beliefs, the standard refinements do not apply. However, in the appendix we show that these beliefs satisfy a refinement akin to the intuitive criterion. These negative beliefs could also be justified for k > 0 if the homo economicus would be willing to pay for information out of curiosity or if spiteful types (θ < 0) existed who are keen on not being prosocial.
5 More formally, δ ≡ pφ
, where φ is defined in Appendix A. This condition implies that the density f (θ) should not increase too steeply anywhere on its domain (see also Bénabou and Tirole, 2006, p. 1668 ).
Relation to Previous Experimental Results
The equilibrium established in Proposition 1 can explain three behavioral patterns found in previous experiments.
Sorting. DWK finds higher rates of giving among dictators who reveal how their choice affects the recipient, than among the full sample of participants. Furthermore, Fong and Oberholzer-Gee (2011) demonstrate that subjects in a dictator game who purchase information about the 'worthiness' of a recipient (poor and disabled versus a drug addict) are on average more generous towards a worthy recipient than subjects who are confronted with the information exogenously. Conversely, those who choose not to acquire information are less generous than those who do not have the option to obtain it. This behavior is consistent with ignorance equilibrium. Since the homo economicus will remain ignorant if k > 0, positive information costs result in sorting: those who remain ignorant will be less generous types than those who inform themselves.
Exculpation. Krupka and Weber (2008) show that experimental subjects assign a higher 'social appropriateness' to a selfish action if the decision maker was (intentionally) unaware of the consequences for others. Similarly, Conrads and Irlenbusch (2011) find that unequal proposals in an ultimatum game are rejected less often if the proposer chose to be ignorant of the payoffs for the responder. Furthermore, our own experiment, reported below, finds that people evaluate decision-makers who choose self-interestedly more positively if they did so under self-imposed ignorance. This is consistent with the equilibrium described in Proposition 1, where the image value of taking a selfish action with full knowledge of the adverse consequences is lower than the value of doing so while ignorant, even if it is known that the decision maker chose not to know. The reason is that an agent who remains ignorant pools with at least some of the social types [0, θ * ), whereas agent who takes a selfish action after knowing that W = w pools only with the homo economicus. Thus, self-imposed ignorance induces a partial exculpation from egoistic motives in signaling equilibrium.
Evasion. Ehrich and Irwin (2005) find that people are reluctant to ask for ethical attributes of consumer products, but will use the information if it is made available exogenously. Furthermore, the most puzzling result of the DWK experiment is that while only 26% choose selfishly in a binary dictator game with full information, 44% choose to remain ignorant of the potentially adverse consequences to the recipient of a self-interested choice. 6 Including the informed participants who fail to sacrifice to help the recipient, a total of 53% of subjects act in a way inconsistent with a preference for the fair outcome in the ignorance game.
These results are inconsistent with theories of outcome-based preferences. Given the results of the full-information baseline game, these theories predict that at most 26% of the subjects would choose ignorance. Social signaling does not account for these results either, since the experiment was anonymous and the recipients did not learn whether the dictator remained ignorant.
To analyze this situation with the self-signaling model, denote by Γ the 'ignorance game' explained above and denote byΓ the simpler game of DWK's Baseline treatment, in which it is common knowledge that W = w, and the only choice is whether or not to take the prosocial action. Using the signaling model, we compare the share of people who choose selfishly in Γ with the share that remains ignorant in game Γ when k = 0 (as is the case in the DWK experiment).
Proposition 2 In gameΓ, there exists an equilibrium with a threshold typeθ, such that all types θ <θ and the homo economicus choose a = 0, and all types θ ≥θ choose a = 1.
Moreover, there existᾱ < 1,μ and 0 < ε <ε < 1 such that if µ >μ and α >ᾱ and ε ∈ [ε,ε], then the share of people who choose ignorance in Γ is higher than the share of people who act selfishly inΓ.
Proposition 2 shows that the signaling model can explain evasion. 7 The intuition for this result is that image concerns drive social types to avoid pooling with the homo economicus.
In gameΓ, the homo economicus chooses a = 0. This increases the signaling value of a pro-social action and induces some marginal social types to behave prosocially. By contrast, in game Γ, a fraction α of the indifferent homo economicus will choose to inform themselves.
This decreases the signaling value of acquiring information. As a consequence, some marginal social types in game Γ switch to ignorance, thus increasing the total amount of selfish choices.
The conditions on the parameters are intuitive in this context. In order to deter the social types from choosing information in game Γ we need a sufficiently large fraction of homo economicus to do so, which explains why ε and α (the fraction of indifferent agents that reveals) need to be large enough. Note that a high α is consistent with the idea that people have preferences for information, evidence for which is presented in Domingues-Martinez, Sloof, and von Siemens (2010) and Loewenstein, Moore, and Weber (2006) . Moreover, the importance of image concerns, as measured by µ, needs to be high enough so that the shift of the social types is large enough to outweigh the effect of the homo economicus acquiring information.
Summarizing, choices under full information produce a clear signal of who the selfish types are. This is not necessarily the case for the more ambiguous information acquisition decision, where the homo economicus may pool with those who inform themselves. The weak signaling incentives to acquire information explain why selfish behavior in the ignorance game can exceed such behavior in the setting without uncertainty.
Experimental Tests of the Self-Signaling Model
The theoretical results establish that self-signaling can explain the puzzling experimental results on strategic ignorance that are inconsistent with other popular models. In this section we report two experiments designed to falsify the self-signaling model, testing additional hypotheses that are consistent with neither outcome-based preferences nor social-image concern.
Both experiments are modeled closely after the "hidden information" treatment of DWK. 8
Subjects were instructed that they would be playing a simple game with one other person with whom they had been randomly and anonymously matched. One of the players was assigned the role of a dictator whose choices determined the payoffs of both players. In the experiment, the dictator was referred to as 'Player X' and the recipient as 'Player Y'. The dictator had to choose between an action A and an action B, which in Experiment 1 yielded the dictator $6 and $5, respectively. The recipient's payoff varied between two different payoff states. In the 'conflicting interests game' (CIG) the recipient's payoffs from A and B were $1 and $5, respectively, while in the 'aligned interests game' (AIG) version the recipient's payoffs were flipped and the recipient obtained $5 and $1, respectively. The dictator was told that each of these two games had been randomly selected with equal probability at the start of the experiment. Before the dictator chose A or B she could choose to find out which game was being played (i.e. the recipient's payoffs from each action) by clicking a button labeled 'reveal game'.
Each subject participated in only one treatment and was not aware of the other treatments. After participants read instructions describing a generic payoff table, they completed a short quiz to ensure that they understood the task. Next they were shown the actual payoffs for the experiment and any other information relevant to their particular experimental condition, before taking another short quiz. The sessions lasted approximately 30 minutes in each experiment. Upon completion of the experiment, participants were paid privately in cash as they exited the room. The interface for both experiments was programmed using the Z-Tree software package (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited using the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2003) .
In both experiments, the dictator was anonymous. Moreover, both roles were informed that the dictator's decision of whether to reveal would be kept private. The dictator could remain ignorant of the payoffs, and the recipient would not know her information state. Thus, while the model has a dual interpretation in terms of either social-image or self-image, the experiments are most plausibly interpreted as a test of the the self-signaling interpretation.
The descriptive statistics, and the number of participants for both experiments are provided in Appendix B and instructions are provided in Appendix D.
Experiment 1: Timing of the Revelation Decision
Ignorance protects self-image because it allows one to avoid the tradeoff between taking a costly prosocial action or being revealed as a selfish individual. If the allocation choice is elicited as a contingent strategy that specifies the chosen behavior in each state, the dictator is forced to reveal her type, and ignorance of the true state no longer protects the decision maker's image. In the first experiment, we examine whether ignorance is less attractive after having made such a contingent choice. Specifically, we vary whether the decision maker decides to reveal the information before or after the choice to be prosocial. So as to provide a complete replication of DWK's "hidden information" experiment, we also reproduce the baseline dictator game with full information of DWK. The experiment was carried out at the Experimental and Behavioral Economics Laboratory (EBEL) at the University of California, Santa Barbara.
Treatments. The three treatments of Experiment 1 are described below. The CIG Only and Reveal Before exactly replicate the DWK experiment while the Reveal After condition highlights the dictator's information choice when she cannot avoid revealing her preferences in the CIG. The participants were presented with the two versions of the game and told that the true payoffs were equally likely and would never be revealed publicly, but that the dictator could reveal them by clicking a button on the same screen labeled "Reveal Game".
3. Reveal After : This condition differed from the Reveal Before condition only in that the dictator entered her outcome choice for each of the two payoff schemes, with the outcome determined by her choice in the game version actually being played. As in the Reveal Before condition, the dictator could reveal the payoffs by clicking a button on the same screen. Before participants were told to which role they had been assigned and were allowed to make a choice, they were given sixty seconds -during which the payoff matrix or matrices were displayed on the screen-to consider their choice. In general, the screen progression and layout reproduced the DWK interface as faithfully as possible. The text of the general instructions were reproduced almost verbatim, as were the condition-specific instructions in the replication conditions. 9
Hypotheses. In the model, we assumed that a fraction α of the indifferent subjects acquires information. In the Reveal Before treatment where only the homo economicus is indifferent, the signaling model therefore predicts the ignorance rate to be (1 − ε)F (θ * ) + ε(1 − α). In the Reveal After treatment, where there is no signaling value from being ignorant, the model predicts an ignorance rate of 1−α. Thus, ignorance is higher in Reveal After if F (θ * ) > 1−α, i.e., when most indifferent people reveal.
The prediction of the model thus depends on α, and may be considered somewhat ambiguous. However, as we argued in the discussion of Proposition 2, there is evidence from multiple studies that people are curious and have a preferences for information. In very different setup from ours, Loewenstein, Moore, and Weber (2006) and Domingues-Martinez, Sloof, and von Siemens (2010) find that many people invest in information acquisition even if this is not in their own interest. Thus, we expect α to be high, which yields the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Ignorance will be lower in the Reveal After than in the Reveal Before treatment.
By contrast, consider the predictions of any model of outcome-based preferences. Suppose the distribution of preferences is such that there is a fraction β ∈ (0, 1) of 'fair' types who prefer the fair outcome in the CIG. All other types prefer same action in both states and will always be indifferent about acquiring information. Such a model predicts that the ignorance rate will be (1 − β)(1 − α) in the Reveal Before treatment, and 1 − α in Reveal After treatment. Thus, there is an unambiguous prediction that ignorance should be lower in the Reveal Before condition, simply because the fair types value the information to make a more informed decision. Comparing our main treatments, the overall ignorance rate in the Reveal After treatment was 0.26. This is significantly lower at the 5% level (p = 0.013) than the 0.54 rate in the Reveal Before condition, thus confirming Hypothesis 1. Note that in the Reveal After treatment, information acquisition does not vary much with the conditional allocation choices. Among the 17 dictators who chose A in both versions of the game, 29% choose ignorance. Among the 15 who chose B only in the CIG game, this rate was 27%. Note that this last group would learn the payoff state simply by observing their own payoff at the end of the session, so the high reveal rate supports the idea that subjects were generally curious to learn the outcome of the game in absence of strategic considerations.
10 Unless otherwise indicated, all results reported hold for a one-sided Fisher's exact test, and the somewhat more powerful a one-sided exact z-test for equal proportions.
11 Interestingly, there is a difference between the CIG only treatment where 35% choose selfishly, and the conditional choices in the CIG game in the Reveal After treatment, in which 54% choose selfishly. This may indicate that the conditional choice is perceived somewhat differently in the context of the ignorance game than it is in the simpler CIG only game. However, a two-sided test (which is appropriate since there is no directional hypothesis) does not find this difference to be significant (p = 0.194).
Experiment 2: Varying Information Costs
The self-signaling model generates some specific predictions about how people react to the cost of information. Specifically, it predicts that some of the social types are strictly better off when they remain ignorant, and would therefore be willing to pay for ignorance. In this experiment we vary the cost of obtaining information in the setting where subjects can find out the payoffs of the recipient before they make the allocation decision. The experiment was carried out at the Frankfurt Laboratory for EXperimental economics (FLEX) at the Goethe University Frankfurt.
Treatments. This experiment differed from Experiment 1 in some details. First, ignorance had to be chosen actively. Whereas in Experiment 1 a Player X who wanted to remain ignorant could simply abstain from clicking the "Reveal Game" button, in this experiment she actively had to click a "Not Reveal" button before being able to make an allocation choice. A second difference is that the highest payoff for the dictator was e10 (instead of $6) and the lowest was e6 (instead of $5). The highest payoff for the dictator was e6 (instead of $5) and the lowest was e1 (instead of $1). Finally, payoffs were expressed in experimental currency, where 10 EC is e1. Although none of these differences alters the structure of the game, they disallow direct comparisons between treatments across the two experiments.
The treatments in this experiment are straightforward manipulations of the game described above. In the Zero Cost treatment, information was free, as it was DWK. The Costly Information treatment was equivalent to the Zero Cost treatment in all aspects, except that the dictator had to pay e0.50 to obtain information. By contrast, in the Costly Ignorance treatment (Costly Ign.) the dictator had to pay e0.50 to remain ignorant.
Hypotheses. The predictions of models of outcome-based preferences and the comparative statics derived from the signaling model for the cost of information (both for k < 0 and for k > 0) all suggest that the ignorance rate in the Zero Cost treatment will be higher than in the Costly Ignorance treatment and lower than in the Costly Information treatment. 12 However, when it comes to the level of ignorance in the Costly Ignorance treatment, the predictions of the signaling model and outcome-based models diverge. While outcome-based models predict that no one would pay to know less, the signaling model predicts that all social types with θ < θ * will strictly prefer ignorance over the trade-off between material 12 As a qualification, we note that for some parameter values the signaling model allows for the possibility that switching from zero information cost to a (very small) positive information cost leads to a decrease in the predicted ignorance rate. This would require the influx of homo economicus into the ignorance pool as a result of the positive cost to decrease its image value enough to generate a compensating exodus of social types away from ignorance. Similarly going from zero cost to a very small cost of ignorance could theoretically lead to more ignorance. These effects are still consistent with the comparative statics derived from either (A.8) or (A.16) as they derive from the discontinuity from switching from the k ≤ 0 case to the k > 0 case. costs and image that may result from acquiring information. This implies that some agents are willing to pay for ignorance.
Hypothesis 2 In the Costly Ignorance treatment there will be a positive fraction of people who will pay to remain ignorant.
Finally, a crucial prediction of the model is that people who choose A in the CIG under full knowledge have a worse image than those who choose ignorance and then choose A. It is this feature of the equilibrium that drives the social types θ < θ * to strictly prefer ignorance.
In one of the treatments, we asked recipients to answer the question "How social [German:
"sozial"] do you rate Player X, based on each of the following actions ...", where actions included the joint decision to become informed or not and to choose A or B. Answers were given on a 5-point scale from "very anti-social" (1) to "very social" (5). 13
Hypothesis 3 Subjects will judge a dictator who acts self-interestedly as less 'social' when she does so under ignorance than when she does so in the CIG.
Results. On average participants earned e10.6, including a e4 show-up fee, with dictators earning e13.40 and recipients e7.82. The right panel of Figure 1 shows the results, descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix B. Clearly, the changes in the ignorance rate are in line with the idea that ignorance increases with the relative cost of information. Introducing a cost for information more than doubles the ignorance rate, while a cost for ignorance more than halves it. The hypothesis of equal proportions can be rejected at 1% (p = 0.000) for the former case, and at 10% (p = 0.058) for the latter case.
Moving to Hypothesis 2, 12% of the subjects are willing to pay to remain ignorant.
Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to test statistically whether this fraction is different from 0, since any test with the null-hypothesis that the true probability is 0 will give a significant result. A two-sided binomial test finds that the interval for which we cannot reject at the 5% level that the true probability is p is [0.04, 0.28]. When we compare the result with a fictional sample featuring zero successes out of 33 trials, we find that the difference is significant at 10% (p=0.058) for a Fisher exact test and at 5% (p = 0.0195) for a z-test of equal proportions. 14 In addition, we observe that the proportion of selfish choices increases as relative information costs go up. The difference between the Zero cost and Costly info treatments is significant at the 1% (p = 0.005) level. The small drop in selfishness in the Costly Ignorance treatment is not significant. Finally, Figure 2 in Appendix C shows the elicited normative evaluations of the dictator (conditional on her strategy). In line with Hypothesis 3, recipients on average judge Player X to be more social when she chooses A under self-imposed ignorance, than when she does so knowingly in the CIG. Conversely, Player X is judged to be more social when she chooses B in the CIG, rather than under ignorance. A Mann-Whitney test shows that the distributions of responses in both cases differ significantly at the 1% level.
Discussion and Conclusion
The results described in the previous section are consistent with the self-signaling theory outlined in Section 2. In Experiment 1 we found that more people reveal after a decision has been made, even though the information is no longer useful to inform the decision. The signaling model predicts that agents avoid information exactly because it may influence the decision, since an increase in transparency generates strong image incentives that 'force' the agent to be prosocial. Thus, the self-signaling model can explain not only strategic ignorance, but also why ignorance is not strategic when it does not shield one from confronting a moral tradeoff. In Experiment 2 we found evidence that higher costs of information decrease prosocial behavior and that some people are willing to pay for ignorance. The signaling model explains this because low social types are strictly better-off avoiding the strong tradeoff between material and image concerns that may result from acquiring information.
Are there are other theories that could also explain these results? First, one may consider theories of outcome-based 'social' preferences that have recently gained popularity in economics. There is evidence that such preferences matter in our experiment. In Experiment 2, participants were asked if they chose to reveal the information, and why (not). About 31% participants who reveal information express concerns for fairness in the questionnaire. 15 However, as we have emphasized, models of outcome based preferences cannot explain the results of our two experiments, as well as the earlier results in DWK.
Second, even though the experiments were conducted anonymously and the recipient did not observe the information-acquisition decision, one may wonder whether social-image concerns could play a role. Although we have stressed the importance of self-image, the model is entirely consistent with an interpretation in terms of social image. The questionnaire responses provide indications that social-image concerns towards the experimenter play some role. Three informed subjects chose the selfish action in the CIG and report (falsely) that they had been ignorant. However, the questionnaire responses also provide evidence of self-signaling. Of the eleven subjects who chose to remain ignorant in the Zero Cost treatment, three answered that they did so not to have a "bad conscience", and two subjects chose ignorance to avoid "having to be nice". We are therefore confident that the results of our experiments are at least partly due to self-image concerns.
Finally, one can speculate about presence of broader psychological motives relating to cognitive dissonance, the psychological cost that arises from the knowledge of having acted contrary to what is morally right (see Matthey and Regner, 2011) . Self-image concerns can be one component of such dissonance, but emotional responses such as guilt or pity may play a role too. If the utility loss from such emotions is convex in the (perceived) probability of harming the other person, such a model may generate information aversion. An advantage of the Bayesian image-based theory presented here is that it provides such convexity without further assumptions on the relation between information and the strength of the emotion.
On the basis of these considerations, we believe that the Bayesian self-signaling model is an important factor in moral decision making. This does not mean that we dismiss models of fairness or social signaling concerns. Decades of research have established the importance of fairness preferences defined over distributions of material payoffs and the relevance of social-image in driving giving behavior. Rather, we argue that these models are incomplete.
Fairness-based models do not take into account how image pressures vary with the context of the decision. Social-signaling models underestimate the importance of image concerns in situations of anonymity.
Our findings have consequences for policy makers who wish to promote prosocial behavior.
The bad news is that while we demonstrate the importance of self-image in giving, our study also highlights how frail this motivation really is. Trivial excuses like self-imposed ignorance can neutralize the demands of our moral conscience and provide us with the excuses we need to behave selfishly. On a more positive note, both the model and the experiment show that much can be achieved by decreasing information costs, for example, through information campaigns. Making information harder to avoid increases self-signaling incentives and is an effective way to encourage prosocial behavior. This is especially valuable in situations where other incentives such as reputation concerns towards others are limited or absent. The self-image model also provides an argument to increase the salience or weight of self-image concerns through the use of moral appeals, codes of conduct, self-evaluations, etc.
In an ideal world, people inform themselves as well as possible. In reality, people are aware that beliefs are reasons for action, and rationally and willfully manipulate their belief systems to support the behavioral patterns from which they benefit. How such signaling behavior is impacted by behavioral biases, by characteristics of the choice environment, or is manipulated by authorities and other social actors is an important topic for future research. 
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We start with the case where k ≤ 0, and the homo economicus chooses information acquisition. Subsequently, we study the case where k > 0. In each case, the proof proceeds in two steps. First, we confirm that the decisions to (not) take the prosocial action are indeed optimal, given proposed off-equilibrium beliefs. Second, given these decisions, we establish which types will acquire information. Finally, we discuss whether the proposed off-equilibrium beliefs are reasonable.
The case where k ≤ 0. We start with some notation. For the social agents, let θ * ∈ (0, 1) be the threshold type who is indifferent between acquiring information and not. To ease notation, let φ a σ = E[θ | a, σ; s] denote the equilibrium expectation conditional on the equilibrium strategy profile, the chosen action a and information σ:
Note that the tie-breaking rule that a fraction α of the homo-economicus chooses information only applies when k = 0. When k < 0, then all homo-economicus strictly prefer to be informed and α has no impact on their behavior. With some abuse of notation, we treat α as being equal to 1 in that case.
Step 1. We now verify whether the proposed decisions to be prosocial or not are optimal, in case a) an informed agent observes σ = σ w , b) an informed agent observes σ = σ 0 , and c) an agent is uninformed. The homo economicus always chooses a = 0, so we concentrate on the social agents.
Step 1a) If σ = σ w , an agent of type θ will take the prosocial action iff
It is immediate that in equilibrium all types θ ≥θ who observed σ = σ w take the prosocial action, and all θ <θ do not. Note thatθ > 0, since we assumed that c > µ.
Step 1b) Next, consider the case in which σ = σ 0 . It is optimal for the agent not to take the prosocial action iff
which is satisfied for any belief since we assumed that c > µ.
Step 1c) Consider now the uninformed agent, σ = ∅. She will take the self-interested action iff
Step 2.
We now check which type will acquire information. Since the homo economicus cares only about his own material payoffs, it is obvious that she will acquire information as long as k < 0 (where the case of k = 0 is covered by our tie-break rule). We know the equilibrium action of the social agents upon (not) acquiring information. Keeping in mind that the equilibrium beliefs depend on θ * , we can derive that θ * is given implicitly by the fixed point equation
Eu(acquire info) = Eu(not acquire info)
It is straightforward that all types θ < θ * remain ignorant and all types θ ≥ θ * acquire information.
Only if θ * <θ do all ignorant types take the self-interested action and only ifθ < θ * will all types who observe σ = σ w indeed take the prosocial action. Next, we will establish sufficient conditions for the existence of a θ * ∈ (0, 1) such thatθ < θ * <θ.
Some algebra shows that θ * <θ iff
Since k ≤ 0, it is sufficient that the RHS of this inequality is positive. It is easy to show that this is the case if off-equilibrium beliefs satisfy φ Existence follows from the continuity of both sides of (A.8).
Combining arguments, an interior equilibrium exists if k < k ≤ 0 and
Since µE F θ w−c+µ < 1 and
is positive for any interior value of θ * (i.e. whatever the value of p), there exists ap < 1 such that this condition will be satisfied for some p >p.
Comparative statics with respect to ignorance levels can be obtained by implicit differentiation of (A.8) with respect to θ * and c, w or k respectively (and using (2)).
The case where k > 0. In this case, the homo-economicus will not acquire information. The equilibrium beliefs become:
Moreover, we will assume that the (now off-equilibrium) belief φ 0 w = 0. The analysis proceeds like before, and is not reconstructed here in detail for reasons of space. We obtainθ
A sufficient condition fork > 0 is that off-equilibrium beliefs satisfy φ 1 w ≥ φ 1 ∅ . It remains to check that θ * < 1. By substituting θ * = 1 into (A.16), we can find the sufficient
. Using (A.17) we obtain p >
Collecting arguments, we have shown that an interior equilibrium exists if 0 < k <k and
Since c < w and φ 0 ∅ < φ 1 w for any value of θ * , there exists ap < 1 such that this condition will be satisfied for some p >p.
Reasonableness of off-equilibrium beliefs. We need to check that the assumptions on offequilibrium beliefs are not unreasonable. The standard refinement for such games, the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987) does not technically apply to this game, because payoffs depend directly on off-equilibrium beliefs. However, we can use logic akin to the intuitive criterion (IC'): we require that off-equilibrium beliefs upon observing the deviation (σ , a ) place zero weight on type θ , if equilibrium payoffs of θ dominate the deviation payoffs when observer beliefs equal E[θ|σ , a ] = 1 (i.e. are maximally optimistic about the sender's type). Thus, off-equilibrium beliefs do not place weight on types that would never deviate, even if this would give them the best possible image.
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In the case where k > 0, we assumed that φ We also assumed that φ 1 ∅ ≤ φ 1 w . A sufficient condition is that type θ * is willing to deviate to the prosocial action under ignorance, since this justifies the assumption that φ
w . This is the case when µ − c ≥ µθ
. Note that the empirical evidence presented in the right panel of Figure 2 supports the assumption that φ
Proof of Proposition 2. First, consider the equilibrium in gameΓ. Definê
The equilibrium thresholdθ is given implicitly by the fixed point equation
Note that the assumptions c < w and µ < c guarantee thatθ is always in the interior, and existence follows from the continuity of both sides of (A.21).
We now turn to the second part of Proposition 2. We can denote the fraction of people who choose prosociallyΓ by (1 − ε)(1 − F (θ(ε))). The fraction of people who choose to reveal information in game Γ is αε + (1 − ε)(1 − F (θ * (ε))). Thus, we want to prove that
(1 − ε)(1 − F (θ(ε))) > αε + (1 − ε)(1 − F (θ * (ε))) i.e. if and only if ∆(ε) > 0. Above, we have shown that this is the case for α and ε sufficiently large.
Let us now consider the RHS of (A.22). Since lim ε↑1 αε 1−ε = ∞, ∃ε such that if ε >ε, then (A.22) does not hold. Since we have shown that the LHS of (A.22) is positive for α and ε sufficiently large, and increasing in µ, we obtain the statement in Proposition 2. How social is Player X?
Appendix B: Summary Statistics
Figure 2: Answers to the question "How social ("sozial") do you think Player X is, based on each of the following actions ...", where actions included the joint decision to be informed or not and to choose e10 or e6. Answers were given on a 5-point scale from "very anti-social" (1) to "very social" (5). Average ratings are based on 31 participants, and are displayed on top of the bars.
N.B. The answers were elicited in the Costly Information treatment, but subjects were explicitly asked to abstract from the cost of information in their evaluation of Player X.
